Relationships among Governance Quality, Institutional Performance, and (Dis)Trust: Trends and Tensions: A Quest for Critical Ingredients of Institutional Trust by Baniamin, Hasan Muhammad
Relationships among Governance
Quality, Institutional Performance,
and (Dis)Trust: Trends and Tensions
A Quest for Critical Ingredients of Institutional Trust
Hasan Muhammad Baniamin
University of Bergen, Norway
2019
Thesis for the Degree of Philosophiae Doctor (PhD)
at the University of Bergen
Avhandling for graden philosophiae doctor (ph.d )
ved Universitetet i ergen
.
2017
Dato for disputas: 1111
Relationships among Governance Quality, Institutional
Performance, and (Dis)Trust: Trends and Tensions
A Quest for Critical Ingredients of Institutional Trust
Hasan Muhammad Baniamin
Date of defence: 14.06.2019
Thesis for the De ree of Philosophiae Doctor (PhD)
The material in this publication is covered by the provisions of the Copyright Act.
Print:     Skipnes Kommunikasjon / University of Bergen
Title: Relationships among Governance Quality, Institutional Performance, and (Dis)Trust: Trends and Tensions
© Copyright Hasan Muhammad Baniamin
Name:        Hasan Muhammad Baniamin
Year:        2019
at the University of Bergen
Avhandling for graden philosophiae doctor (ph.d )
ved Universitetet i ergen
.
2017
Dato for disputas: 1111
Relationships among Governance Quality,
Institutional Performance, and (Dis)Trust:
Trends and Tensions
A Quest for Critical Ingredients of Institutional Trust
Hasan Muhammad Baniamin
Thesis for the De ree of Philosophiae Doctor (PhD)
The material in this publication is covered by the provisions of the Copyright Act.
Print:     Skipnes Kommunikasjon / University of Bergen
Title: Relationships among Governance Quality, Institutional Performance, and (Dis)Trust: Trends
and Tensions
© Copyright Hasan Muhammad Baniamin
Name:        Hasan Muhammad Baniamin
i 
 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ACO Authoritarian Cultural Orientation 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
BDT Bangladeshi Taka (Currency) 
CPI Corruption Perceptions Index 
DDC District Development Committee 
DGHS Directorate General of Health Services 
EVS European Values Study 
GND Grama Niladhari Divisions (lowest administrative unit in Sri Lanka)  
GoT Governance and Trust Survey 
HDI Human Development Index 
LKR Sri Lankan Rupee 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NPM New Public Management 
NPR Nepalese Rupee 
NORHED Norwegian Programme for Capacity Development in Higher Education 
and Research for Development 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PD Power Distance 
SEP Service Enabling Processes 
SIP Service Impeding Processes 
ii 
 
TI Transparency International 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
VDC Village Development Committees 
WVS World Values Survey 
WHO World Health Organization 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
Many people have helped me on my long and uphill journey towards completing my PhD 
dissertation. I would like to acknowledge these people and their numerous contributions. 
Their support, guidance and unfailing inspiration have helped me reach my goal. I would first 
of all like to thank Professor Ishtiaq Jamil and Professor Steinar Askvik for being my mentors 
and supervisors throughout the endeavor. Their advice, interesting ideas and constructive 
criticism were very useful to me. I also enjoyed being with them as part of ‘Globalization and 
Development’ research group. It was my pleasure to work as a teaching assistant in this group 
and to guide the Master students in Public Administration, particularly during their thesis 
writing. During my work at the Department of Administration and Organization Theory at the 
University of Bergen, I have had the opportunity to observe and learn about the work culture 
in a Norwegian university. I particularly like the egalitarian and participatory aspects, and the 
freedom to work on my tasks.  
I am thankful to the Norwegian government for giving me a scholarship allowing me to 
peruse my PhD in Norway, and to the Meltzer Research Fund, which provided funding during 
my PhD process. With financial help from Meltzer and my research group, I was able to 
participate in PhD training courses at places such as the London School of Economics and 
Political Science (LSE), and the University of Oslo. The generous support from these two 
sources also made it possible for me to participate in various conferences and present my 
research findings. The research articles in my dissertation were presented at the European 
Group of Public Administration (EGPA) Conference, 2016 in Utrecht, Netherlands; the 
American Society of Public Administration (ASPA) Conference, 2017 in Atlanta, USA; the 
European Survey Research Association (ERSA) Conference, 2017 in Lisbon, Portugal; the 
International Research Society for Public Management (IRSPM) Conference, 2017 in 
Budapest, Hungary, and in 2018 in Edinburgh, Scotland. I am also grateful to the German 
government for offering me a German Academic Exchange scholarship (DAAD) for 
methodological training at the GESIS (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) in Cologne, 
Germany. 
The PhD coordinators Professor Lars Chr. Blichner, Professor Julia Fleischer, and Associate 
Professor Martina Vukasovic deserve much thanks for their constructive comments and 
advice on how to improve my articles. Also very useful were the comments of colleagues who 
attended the PhD seminars. Professor Lise Rakner, Postdoctoral Fellow Svein-Erik Hansen 
Helle, Postdoctoral Fellow Kiran Auerbach, Senior Advisor David Aled Williams, and 
iv 
 
Advisor David Jackson from the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre at the Chr. Michelsen 
Institute all deserve thanks for their comments on my studies.  
I would also like to thank Tom Gundersen, Ingunn Franck Ellingsen, Charlotte Lillefjære-
Tertnæs, Maren Bjotveit, and Denise Fewtrell Flatmark for their help in administrative 
matters.  
Finally, I would like to convey deep gratitude to my beloved wife Farzana Husain (Kumkum) 
for her sacrifices and continuous support, and to my beloved parents and brother for their 
continuous blessings and support.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation analyzes institutional trust, first, in the three South Asian countries of 
Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, and then in 32 African countries. These countries were 
chosen in order to explore why citizens in developing countries trust public institutions 
despite those institutions’ poor performance. Most of the existing literature on institutional 
trust indicates that trust in public institutions is contingent on institutional performance and 
governance quality. This view accords with the rational choice theory and the logic of 
consequences, with the argument that citizens will evaluate better performance and 
governance positively, and poor performance and bad governance negatively. These 
evaluations should be reflected in the citizens’ trust in government institutions. Based on this 
logic, governmental organizations and agencies, for instance those in OECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, should enjoy higher institutional trust 
than do such organizations and agencies that perform poorly, examples being those in non-
OECD countries. This is because various public institutions in OECD countries, when they 
are compared with similar institutions in non-OECD countries, have generally higher 
performance in a number of areas, for instance in the health and education sectors, and they 
have better governance. However, certain cross-country surveys (e.g., the World Values 
Survey and the European Values Study) indicate that public institutions in a number of non-
OECD countries, despite their lower performance and poor governance, enjoy higher 
institutional trust than do comparable institutions in OECD countries. The ‘logic of 
consequences’ then becomes questionable as an explanatory variable of institutional trust, and 
the use of rational choice theory becomes problematic as a theoretical lens through which to 
explain the same phenomenon. This is the point of departure for this dissertation. 
The articles in this dissertation propose that along with the consequential logic of rational 
choice theory, additional explanatory variables may be required to explain the empirical 
inconsistency of inflated trust in the public institutions of under-performing countries. The 
proposed variable is based on a cultural attribute, more specifically, authoritarian cultural 
orientation (ACO). This cultural attribute is tested through a country-representative survey 
called the Governance and Trust Survey 2 (GoT 2), which was administered in Bangladesh, 
Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Thereafter, the effects of a similar kind of cultural orientation are 
explored in 32 African countries using survey data from Afro-barometer. The proposed 
cultural norm measured by ACO indicates something about people’s degree of unquestioning 
obedience to authority. People who have higher ACO tend to have a higher degree of 
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institutional trust. This cultural aspect is related to social values and norms, obligations, and 
commitment, which together are referred to as the ‘logic of appropriateness’, as described by 
March and Olsen (1996 and 1998). The first three articles in this dissertation explore the 
importance of the logic of appropriateness in combination with the logic of consequences in 
explaining institutional trust. Among these three articles, the first two use ACO to try to 
explain trust in the civil service, while the third tries to explain trust in various other 
institutions such as the parliament, the police, and the judicial court. All these articles confirm 
that ACO matters in explaining institutional trust in the sampled countries.  
In the third article, one key finding is that higher education can contribute to reducing ACO. 
Education may increase people’s cognitive ability, encourage them to become more assertive, 
and to question authorities and their actions. This may help reduce the degree of 
unquestioning obedience, which is the indicator of ACO. Interestingly, the second article 
finds that people with higher ACO usually assess civil servants positively; they have a 
comparatively strong belief that civil servants are prompt, efficient, and tend to treat people 
equally. In the fourth article, which analyzes the same phenomenon in 32 African countries 
also found that people with higher education have lower institutional trust. Like the articles on 
South Asia, the fourth article confirms that people with lower assertiveness have higher 
institutional trust. The relation between low assertiveness and institutional trust therefore 
parallels the relation between ACO and institutional trust. The fourth article also indicates that 
people with lower assertiveness believe their country has less governance-related problems 
(e.g., corruption or unfair treatment) than do people with higher assertiveness. Similarly, 
people with lower assertiveness think their country is doing better in different performance 
indicators such as management of the economy and the creation of employment.   
The focus of the fifth article is slightly different. It tries to explain why the Nepalese anti-
corruption agency has higher trust than the similar agencies of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka – 
despite the fact that all three countries are characterized by a relatively high level of 
corruption. This study finds that the Sri Lankan anti-corruption agency is dormant (few anti-
corruption interventions1), while the Nepalese and Bangladeshi agencies operate selectively. 
The Nepalese anti-corruption agency has initiated a number of anti-corruption initiatives 
against the lower-level officials, particularly against the school teachers with fake academic 
certificates. These actions make the agency more visible to the general public and convince 
them that the agency is seriously trying to stamp out corruption. This may contribute to the 
                                                          
1 The study mainly captures the situation before the establishment of Maithripala Sirisena’s government in 2015.  
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higher institutional trust that it enjoys. Since the Nepalese agency has not taken any major 
steps to curb the corruption of politicians and higher-level bureaucrats, the overall corruption 
level is yet to be improved there. In Bangladesh, the anti-corruption agency targets both 
higher-level and lower-level people in the power structure, but does so selectively, mainly 
directing its attention to members of the opposition party. Thus, this article indicates that 
perceived performance, which may vary from real performance, may affect institutional trust.  
The last article is about the possible problem of having an incentive system for credence 
goods. Credence goods are goods which involve information asymmetry between service 
providers and consumers. In this situation of information asymmetry, service providers know 
more about the required nature or quality and quantity of the services than do the consumers. 
Health services are a good example. In such situations, consumers must depend on the 
trustworthiness of service providers, and this dependency can make service recipients 
vulnerable to monetary exploitation. By analyzing the childbirth delivery system of 
Bangladesh, the study finds that private clinics have a higher level of overtreatment problems 
(e.g., caesarian delivery without proper medical grounds) than do government and NGO 
health facilities. This is because private clinics have more incentive to capitalize on 
information asymmetry, due to their dependency on the earnings from the services they 
provide.  
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An Introduction to the Study of Trust and Institutional Trust 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This dissertation is about explaining institutional trust. Trust is an important variable in 
explaining relationships between individuals, and between individuals and institutions. The 
main question addressed in the articles in this dissertation is this: Do institutional performance 
and governance quality explain citizens’ trust in public institutions, or do we need to 
incorporate other variables to explain citizens’ trust in institutions? For this dissertation, 
institutional trust indicates the degree of confidence citizens have in an institution. The most 
commonly used variables to explain institutional trust are institutional performance and 
governance quality. These reflect calculations on the part of citizens, where higher 
performance and better governance are evaluated positively and generate higher institutional 
trust. This consequential logic, however, which is based on rational choice, is not always 
supported by empirical data. Various survey responses show that there can be higher 
institutional trust despite lower performance and poor governance. Some developing counties 
(e.g., Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) show a higher level of institutional trust compared to 
many developed countries that enjoy a higher quality of governance and better-performing 
public institutions.  
Why does this inconsistency arise? It may have something to do with the quality of data. 
There could, for instance, be sampling errors, or the data enumerators may be unreliable, or 
there could be irregularities in data processing. However, given that different surveys by 
different institutions at different times and based on different respondents (e.g. the World 
Values Survey, Afro-barometer, Asia-barometer, and the Governance and Trust Survey) all 
show a similar trend of higher institutional trust despite poor performance, there is a good 
reason to explore the possible explanations for this kind of inflated trust in the selected 
countries. To explain the mismatch between the theoretical expectations and the empirical 
data, we explore the effect of an additional variable that is based on cultural attributes, more 
specifically, ‘authoritarian cultural orientation’ (ACO). First, the effect of ACO on 
institutional trust is explored in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka using survey data from the 
Governance and Trust Survey 2 (GoT 2). After this, data from Afro-barometer 5 is used to 
examine the effect of a variable that is similar to ACO – the degree of assertiveness – and to 
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see how it affects institutional trust in 32 African countries. The articles in this doctoral 
dissertation therefore mainly focus on the institutional trust dynamics in developing countries.  
This introductory chapter summarizes the major findings of the six articles of this PhD 
project. It starts with a short description of the necessity of studying trust and institutional 
trust. After this, there follows a summary of the arguments that inspired the writing of the 
articles. This summary is followed by a presentation of the overarching theoretical framework 
of the dissertation, and then a short methodological note on the articles. The methodological 
note explains the reasons for selecting the areas for the studies, the sources of data, and the 
data collection techniques. After this, there is a short summary of each of the six articles. The 
chapter then presents a short discussion linking the main findings of the articles with the 
overarching theoretical framework. The next section highlights the implications of the 
identified cultural attribute (ACO). The chapter ends with a discussion of the limitations of 
the studies, ideas for future research on institutional trust, and some concluding remarks.  
2. The Importance of Studying Trust and Institutional Trust 
The literature on institutional trust indicates that there are different dynamics at work in the 
phenomenon, as well as a range of arguments for why it does or does not arise. When citizens 
trust public institutions, this indicates something about how the institutions are managed and 
the extent to which they are successful (Askvik, 2007; Askvik and Bak, 2005; Bouckaert et 
al., 2005; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Van de Walle and Bouckaert, 2003; Askvik and Jamil, 
2013). It is claimed that trust has substantial links to social and economic development, the 
effectiveness of political systems, personal happiness, relatively better health, education and 
higher income, tolerance of minorities, and other beneficial societal outcomes (Almedom, 
2005; Portes, 1998; Realo et al., 2008; Uslaner, 2002; Rothstein and Eek, 2009). Kim (2005) 
observes that a high level of citizens’ trust in public institutions can ensure good governance 
and the successful implementation of policies. In a similar tone, Van der Meer and Dekker 
(2011) claim that trust works like glue to keep a governance system together, and like oil to 
lubricate the policy machine. According to one governance paradigm, citizens’ participation 
and networking in governing are considered crucial elements; they are closely related to the 
degree of trust between the different actors involved (Doh, 2014). In new democracies, a high 
level of trust in public institutions can facilitate democratic consolidation, while in 
authoritarian regimes, it reflects how strongly such regimes are holding on to power (Wong et 
al., 2011). 
3 
 
Without institutional trust, citizens may not follow rules, cooperate in providing collective 
goods or respond appropriately in times of emergency (Van Ryzin, 2011). A low level of such 
trust may indicate the potential for a crisis in governability (Cook and Gronke, 2005). Due to 
a lack of trust, “flexibility and discretion become severely constrained” and “it hinders 
informal relationship[s] and lead[s] to an excessive dependence on rules, formal procedures, 
regulations and legalisms” (Ruscio, 1996: 463). Bradach and Eccles (1989) identify three 
governance mechanisms which can be mixed for better performance: market/price, authority, 
and trust. According to these scholars, market opportunism can be mixed with bureaucratic 
control, while institutional trust can moderate the extreme effects of both mechanisms. 
Fukuyama (1995) claims that levels of institutional trust can explain many of the differences 
in economic progress amongst countries. This is because such trust can make transactions 
easy and efficient (Ruscio, 1996). Nevertheless, the causal direction of institutional trust is 
unclear (Lee, 2012), given that statistical analysis only indicates that social trust correlates 
positively with a number of political, social, and economic conditions that are “normatively 
desirable” (Rothstein and Eek, 2009). On one hand, trust can be a source of efficiency in 
market transactions (Granovetter, 1985), which can lead to more efficient economic 
outcomes, and it can create better functioning institutions (Lee, 2012). On the other hand, the 
level of trust can also be a consequence of institutional performance rather than its cause 
(Mishler and Rose, 2001; Rothstein, 1998, 2002; Lee, 2012). Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) 
show that in Sweden, citizens who interact with need-testing welfare institutions have less 
trust than people who only interact with universal welfare institutions (non-need testing). This 
is the case, they argue, because people may perceive need-testing institutions as less impartial 
or opaque, due to the process of assessing eligibility for the service. These findings provide 
support for the assumption that trust is a consequence of institutional outcomes. While this 
may be true, it may also be true that trust is a cause of good institutional performance; trust 
therefore affects institutions and institutions affect trust. Thus, the different dynamics of trust 
and institutional trust have, for many years, triggered substantial scholarly interest and 
research, with the aim of gaining deeper understanding.  
Different public-service reforms have been implemented in order to increase citizens’ trust in 
government; for example, Reinventing Government in the United States, La Rélève in 
Canada, and the Next Steps Program in the United Kingdom (Barnes and Gill, 2000; Van de 
Walle and Bouckaert, 2003, cited in Kampen et al., 2006). The performance movements in the 
United States and Europe operate on the assumption that a government can restore public trust 
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by delivering and demonstrating results (Bouckaert, 2008). However, scholars show that the 
causes and effects of public trust are complex (Kim, 2010). Such trust is often based on 
subjective perceptions rather than on objective judgement (Welch et al., 2004). This is why 
Christensen and Lægreid (2005) emphasize the need for research that makes comparisons 
between countries, in order to understand the sources and variations of institutional trust. The 
articles in this dissertation attempt to do this, in order to understand the dynamics of 
institutional trust in the developing countries.  
3. Rationale for the Studies 
A large body of literature has shown that the degree of institutional trust in a country is related 
to a range of governance indicators (e.g., Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Grönlund and Setälä, 
2011; Armah-Attoh et al., 2007). When policies are not implemented, when services are not 
provided efficiently and effectively and when power and authority are misused, a situation of 
mistrust can arise (Askvik and Bak, 2005). Different definitions of institutional trust also 
reflect these connections. Miller and Listhaug (1990: 358) define institutional trust as the 
“evaluation of whether or not political authorities and institutions are performing in 
accordance with normative expectations held by the public.” Similarly, Giddens (1996: 34) 
defines trust as “confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of 
outcomes or events.” A biased, unfair, and corrupt system generally goes hand in hand with 
low levels of trust (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). Poor institutional performance reduces the 
degree to which individuals trust their government (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011). Thus, the 
‘quality of government’ and the ‘degree of performance’ of different institutions in a country 
are associated with the extent of citizens’ trust in those institutions (Doh, 2014). According to 
this train of thought, in countries with relatively low quality of governance and poor 
institutional performance, there should be a lower level of institutional trust than in countries 
that have higher quality of governance and better institutional performance.  
Figure 1: Relation between the Human Development Index, 2015 by UNDP, and trust in civil 
service in different countries  
Note: Both reference lines are drawn based on median values, and trust in civil service is measured 
from the data of WVS 6, EVS 4 and GoT 2.  
But the situation is not that straightforward because survey data uncovers a puzzle. The 
latest data from the World Values Survey (WVS) 6 (2010-14) and the European Values 
Study (EVS) 4 (2008-10) indicate that there are quite a number of non-OECD countries in 
which the trust levels in the civil service are higher than the trust levels in the OECD 
countries (details are in article 1). These non-OECD countries have a much lower 
performance level as measured in the Human Development Index (HDI), which is 
published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (objective measure of 
performance), than do most of the OECD countries (Figure 1). Furthermore, most of the 
non-OECD countries score low in the Democracy Index (2015) published by the Economic 
Intelligence Unit, and in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency 
International (Figures 2 and 3).  
On the basis of rational calculations, it would seem reasonable to assume that trust in public 
institutions is higher in established and well-functioning democracies than in other countries,
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because the public institutions in well-functioning democracies are supposed to be more 
responsive to the needs of the people (Grönlund and Setälä, 2011). Such a connection, 
however, is not reflected in the empirical data indicated in Figure 2. Figure 3, which reveals a 
pattern similar to the inconsistent relationship between democracy and institutional trust 
shown in Figure 2, also indicates that a country can have higher institutional trust despite a 
higher level of corruption. Thus, the performance and governance-based explanations become 
problematic for explaining higher levels of trust in the civil service in non-OECD countries. 
Due to the inconsistences between theoretical expectations and empirical findings on the 
relationship between institutional trust and performance, Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2003: 
891) say that “this is a very rational and mechanistic reasoning, only part of which 
corresponds to reality.” The higher level of trust is not only visible for the civil service of 
many non-OECD countries, but also for many of their other public institutions. For example, 
in many non-OECD countries, there is higher trust in government as a whole (details are in 
article 4). Here, trust in government indicates the combined trust index of the three main 
organs of government: the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature (parliament).  
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The way in which the countries are positioned in boxes Q1 and Q3 in Figures 1, 2 and 3 is 
more or less consistent with the ‘governance and performance-based hypothesis’ that higher 
performance and better governance lead to higher institutional trust (situation of Q1), and 
alternatively, that lower performance and poor governance generate lower institutional trust 
(situation of Q3). However, the positioning of the countries in Q2 and Q4 does not cohere 
with this logic of performance and quality of governance. The countries that have lower trust 
despite higher performance and better governance (situation of Q4 in Figures 1, 2, and 3) are 
explained by post-materialism and the rise of critical citizens (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; 
Norris, 2011). Meanwhile, the situation of Q2 in Figures 1, 2, and 3 poses a puzzle which 
shows that a number of countries display higher trust despite lower performance and poor 
governance. The studies of this dissertation try to shed light on this puzzle. In this regard, the 
dissertation argues that in order to explain the inflated institutional trust reported in these 
underperforming countries, we need to incorporate additional variables. One such variable is 
tested in this dissertation: authoritarian cultural orientation (ACO).  
The fifth article is about the level of citizens’ trust in the anti-corruption agencies (ACA) in 
three South Asian countries (Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka). All three countries are 
plagued by a high level of corruption, but of the three anti-corruption agencies, the Nepalese 
one has higher trust. This article explores possible explanations for this inconsistent trend. 
The last article is about professional trust and incentive systems for credence goods. It 
explores the possible problem of having an incentive system for credence goods such as 
health services. For this, the study analyzes the childbirth system in Bangladesh.  
4. Overarching Theoretical Framework 
4.1 Clarification of the Concepts 
Institutional theory can provide a comprehensive lens for understanding how the logic of trust 
can exist in a societal context (Fuglsang and Jagd, 2015). The theory can be useful for 
exploring the empirical inconsistencies which are the starting point for this dissertation 
because it can provide explanations that extend beyond performance-based logic and 
governance-quality-based logic. For this study, the ‘institution’ concept indicates something 
about both formal (narrower meaning) and informal (broader meaning) forms of institutions. 
In the formal or narrower form, the concept points to formally organized arrangements which 
define the settings in which governing and policy making take place (March and Olsen, 
2011). When the articles in this dissertation discuss institutional performance, governance 
quality, and trust, they mainly address the formal form of institutions, that is, the performance 
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or trust in different institutions such as the parliament, the civil service, and the judiciary. In 
this dissertation, ‘institutional trust’ denotes the degree of confidence which the public has in 
an institution. Measuring confidence is a standard way of measuring trust in all major surveys. 
For all the studies in this dissertation, the terms ‘institutions’ and ‘organizations’ are used 
interchangeably. This is because organizations become institutions when they are “recognized 
as valuable in themselves, beyond the technical requirements related to the carrying out of 
specific tasks” (Askvik, 1993:151). Given that different countries’ key public organizations 
such as the civil service, the judiciary, and the parliament have value above and beyond their 
technical requirements, they can be considered as institutions. 
The articles use the broader lens supplied by the ‘institution’ concept to explain the 
institutional trust level. In a broad sense, institutions include contexts such as societal norms 
and values; these norms and values can shape institutional trust in addition to institutional 
performance and governance quality. From this perspective, an institution is a relatively stable 
collection of practices and rules which define appropriate behavior for specific actors in 
specific situations (March and Olsen, 1998). Institutions are thus broadly conceived as “the 
rules of the game in a society or, more formally, [they] are the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3). In the same vein, Friedland and Alfrod (1991) 
define institutions as “patterns of human activity and symbolic systems, cognitive 
constructions and normative rules through which actors categorize that activity and infuse it 
with meaning and value” (cited in Hanf and Jansen, 1998: 4). 
4.2 Theoretical Underpinnings  
Rational choice institutionalists, on one hand, posit that actors have a fixed set of preferences 
and behave entirely instrumentally to maximize the attainment of these preferences (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996). On the other hand, sociological and historical institutionalists perceive that the 
preferences and actions of actors are shaped by the contexts or the cultural arrangements in 
which they find themselves (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Rational choice institutionalists thus 
argue that preference formation is exogenous, while historical institutionalists argue that it is 
endogenous (Thelen, 1999). Sociological institutionalists have a notion of preference 
formation which is similar to that of historical institutionalists. Historical institutionalists use 
two approaches to explain human actions: the calculative approach and the cultural approach. 
According to the calculative approach, human actions are instrumental and based on a 
strategic cost-benefit calculation. The cultural approach, by contrast, predicts that human 
actions are not fully strategic but bounded by an individual’s worldview (Hall and Taylor, 
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1996). According to the rationalist perspective, institutional trust develops through inductive 
reasoning. However, a person’s calculative nature can also be shaped by non-calculative 
cultural values. Ruscio (1996: 461) indicates that a non-calculative approach to explaining 
human actions depends on values, norms, obligations and duties, all of which can influence 
behavior in combination with self-interest. Thus, culture can shape actions by providing ends 
or values by which the actions are guided, and can become a central causal element (Grimes 
and McKay, 2015). 
To explain these two types of action (the calculative and the cultural), March and Olsen (1996 
and 1998) describe two forms of logic: the logic of consequences and the logic of 
appropriateness. According to the logic of consequences, people’s actions are based on their 
expectations of consequences (March and Olsen, 1998). On the other hand, according to the 
logic of appropriateness, people’s decision-making processes will be biased toward what their 
social norms deem to be right, rather than on what a cost-benefit calculation would consider 
best (Balsiger, 2016). Under this latter logic, actors’ behavior is based on “the 
institutionalized practices of a collectivity and mutual understanding of what is true, 
reasonable, natural, right and good” (Olsen, 2007: 3). This accounts for how people think, feel 
and organize themselves. Their loyalty, devotion, respect, friendship, as well as hate, anger, 
fear, envy, and guilt are made appropriate to particular identities in particular situations 
(March and Olsen, 1996). Thus, when comparing the logic of consequences and the logic of 
appropriateness, it is the latter which extends beyond the scope of the cost-benefit strategy 
and gives a more comprehensive view of human motivation for a specific action. Based on 
these two logics, we can create a 2 × 2 matrix which helps us understand human processes of 
evaluating events and actions. 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Evaluation of an action based on different logics 
Source: Own construction based on March and Olsen (1996) 
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From Figure 4, it appears that for the first quadrant (Q1), both logics play significant roles in 
the process of evaluating actions. Here, people’s logics are guided by cost-benefit calculation, 
but that calculation is also shaped by social norms and behavior. In the second scenario (Q2), 
people’s actions and their evaluations are mainly influenced by social norms and values. 
People tend to do what is socially acceptable instead of just basing their actions on cost-
benefit analysis. This can explain behavior such as ethnic cleansing, blood feuds, and moral 
heroism (March and Olsen, 2011). Quadrant 3 (Q3) is a ‘zone of indifference’, which 
indicates a lack of applying any logic. Evaluations in such cases are probably affected by 
randomness. In quadrant 4 (Q4), actions and their evaluations are mainly based on cost-
benefit logic, as predicted by rational-choice theory. In reality, most evaluations of actions 
can probably be characterized as falling under scenario Q1, and least of all under scenario Q3. 
This is because for every evaluation, people usually apply one or more type of logic, which 
can be based on rational calculation or values or a combination of both. 
4.3 Variables for the Studies  
Evaluation processes of institutional outputs such as institutional performance and governance 
quality are mainly calculation-based and guided by the logic of consequences. If an institution 
performs well, people will evaluate it positively and have higher trust in that institution. 
Similarly, if a country’s quality of governance is good (for example, if corruption is 
controlled and fair treatment is ensured), then people will have a high level of trust in the 
government. In such situations, people’s actions are explained by consequential reasons, as 
indicated by March and Olsen (1998). Ruscio (1996) also terms this calculative nature of 
individual reasoning as the logic of consequences. However, the logic of appropriateness 
indicates that “actors seek to fulfil the obligations and duties encapsulated in a role, an 
identity, and a membership in a political community” (Olsen, 2007: 3). This logic indicates 
that actors’ strategic and calculative behavior is shaped by cultural norms. The logic of 
appropriateness shifts the level of trust in an institution to a different position than it would be 
at if a person had only based his or her trust on rational and objective analysis (the situation of 
Q4 in Figure 4). Thus, the logic of appropriateness can provide a possible answer to the 
question of why there is inflated institutional trust in the sample countries. In hierarchical 
societies such as we find in the three South Asian countries, obedience to authority is an 
obligation. This obligation (the measure of ACO) can become an important determinant of the 
formation of institutional trust. By recognizing the importance of both logics, March and 
Olsen (1998) state that actors’ actions generally cannot be explained solely by either the logic 
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of consequences or the logic of appropriateness; any particular action by an actor probably 
involves both types of logic. Thus, the logic of appropriateness can be useful for explaining 
the main empirical puzzle that backgrounds this dissertation. The first four articles in this 
dissertation explore the effects of both logics (independent variables) for understanding 
institutional trust (dependent variable). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Relationship between independent and dependent variables 
The fifth article in this dissertation mainly pursues the relationship between the logic of 
consequences and institutional trust. It explores possible explanations for variations in the 
trust levels in anti-corruption agencies in the sample countries (Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri 
Lanka). For this study, therefore, the level of trust in an anti-corruption agency is the 
dependent variable. Different predictors of institutional trust (e.g., the perceived intensity of 
political and bureaucratic corruption) are used to understand the level of trust in anti-
corruption agencies. According to the logic of consequences, a higher perceived intensity of 
both political and bureaucratic corruption should reduce the amount of trust which an anti-
corruption agency receives. Similarly, personal exposure to corruption may also negatively 
affect institutional trust. Along with these explanatory variables, the target and the intensity of 
anti-corruption drives by anti-corruption agencies may provide explanations for the variations 
Logic of Appropriateness 
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degree of assertiveness) 
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(Measured by: Institutional 
performance and governance 
quality) 
Institutional Trust 
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of trust levels. If an anti-corruption agency performs its duties efficiently and neutrally, it 
should receive higher trust from citizens than if it performed in the opposite manner.    
The last article deals with the difficulties of measuring the logic of consequence 
(performance) for credence goods such as health services. Due to this difficulty, having an 
incentive system for health services can be problematic. For this study, the nature of treatment 
(normal child delivery versus cesarean child delivery) is the dependent variable, and the 
incentive structure of the service delivery institutions (low versus high) is the main 
explanatory or interest variable.  
5. Data and Method 
5.1 Study Areas and Sources of Data 
The selection of the study areas is based on both practical and scientific reasons. The first 
three articles (two are on trust in the civil service, and the third is on trust in public institutions 
in general, which also includes trust in the civil service) and the fifth article (trust in anti-
corruption agencies) are based mainly on the South Asian countries of Bangladesh, Nepal, 
and Sri Lanka. The main scientific reason for selecting these countries is that they show a 
surprisingly high level of trust in various public institutions, despite those institutions’ 
relatively poor performance and weak governance. But there is a practical reason as well: the 
initial PhD project was designed to work on data which was collected under the Governance 
and Trust Survey 2 (GoT 2) by a NORHED2 funded project in these three countries. After 
conducting preliminary analysis of the GoT 2 data, some confusion arose because the higher 
level of trust in public institutions in these three countries was unexpected. We therefore 
analyzed data from similar surveys (such as WVS and Asia-barometer) and, surprisingly, 
found the same trend of a higher level of trust in public institutions in many other under-
performing countries, including these three South Asian countries. In order to explain this 
inflated trust, these studies introduced the ‘authoritarian cultural orientation’ (ACO) variable 
along with other variables. In the fourth article, the focus of the study extends to African 
countries where a similar situation of inflated trust is also observed, despite poor institutional 
performance and weak governance. For this article, data from Afro-barometer was used to 
measure a variable similar to ACO, in an effort to explain institutional trust in 32 African 
countries. The last study of this dissertation was mainly based on the childbirth system of 
                                                          
2 The Norwegian Programme for Capacity Development in Higher Education and Research for Development – NORHED. 
This survey is called round 2 because there was an earlier round of the survey in 2008-2009. 
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Bangladesh. The different methods that were used for the different studies of this dissertation 
are described below: 
5.1.1 Survey Data 
The studies used survey databases such as the Government and Trust Survey 2 (GoT 2) 
(2014-15), the World Values Survey (WVS) 6 (2010-2014), the European Values Study 
(EVS) 4 (2008-2010) and Afro-barometer 5 (2015). WVS 6 and EVS 4 were mainly used to 
analyze global trends on trust in institutions such as the civil service. However, the major 
source of data for explaining institutional trust in the three South Asian countries was the 
Government and Trust Survey 2 (GoT 2) (2014-15). Data from this survey was used for the 
first three articles and the fifth article. The fourth article is based on data from Afro-barometer 
5 (2015).  
5.1.2 Interviews 
As stated, the fifth article, which is about trust in anti-corruption institutions in Bangladesh, 
Nepal, and Sri Lanka, used the GoT 2 survey data. In addition to this survey data, 25 
interviews were conducted to gain further insight on anti-corruption institutions and their 
activities. Interviewees were mostly selected based on convenience and snowball techniques. 
This is why most of them were academics from universities participating in the NORHED 
funded project. 
Table 1: Different methods for different studies of this dissertation  
Article 
Number Methods Sources of Data 
1 Survey WVS 6, EVS 4, and GoT 2 
2 Survey GoT 2 
3 Survey GoT 2 
4 Survey WVS 6, EVS 4, and Afro-barometer 5 
5 
Survey GoT 2 
Interviews 
25 interviewees; they are selected 
based on convenience and snowball 
techniques  
Netnography Social media (Facebook) 
Web content analysis 4 newspapers 
6 
Registry data analysis Government of Bangladesh 
Online survey Own survey based on convenience and 
snowball techniques 
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5.1.3 Netnography 
The anti-corruption agency of Nepal has a Facebook page to disseminate information related 
to its activities (link: https://www.facebook.com/NepalCIAA/); on this page, the agency used 
to post news and reports. In the comments section under these posts, many Nepalese 
expressed their opinions. During the research period, I followed this page regularly to track 
citizens’ opinions, particularly in the year 2015. Many of the comments were in the Nepalese 
language and only few were in English. I therefore used online translating functions 
(Facebook’s automatic translator and Google translator) to comprehend the comments. This 
may of course pose a limitation to the study since such online translation tools are not always 
accurate. Nevertheless, through the translation functions, it was possible to get a general idea 
about people’s opinions, and they were found to be useful for this study. A similar exercise in 
the other two countries was not possible since no online platforms were found for anti-
corruption agencies of those countries.  
5.1.4 Web Content Analysis 
Data on corruption and the anti-corruption commission in Bangladesh were collected from 
reviewing and analyzing online versions of four widely-read local newspapers (the Daily Star, 
the New Age, the Ittefaq and the Prothom-Alo). To identify news related to the anti-
corruption commission, key words such as ‘corruption’ and ‘anti-corruption commission’ 
were used. Reviewing these newspapers was helpful for gaining data on corruption, but there 
were of course some limitations; for example, newspapers usually publish news that is 
assumed to be of interest to general readers, so not all types of corruption are necessarily 
reported on, especially petty corruption.  
5.1.5 Registry Data 
Data for the study of the childbirth system in Bangladesh, which is the subject of the last 
article, stems mainly from the Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS), Government 
of Bangladesh (2015), available at http://www.dghs.gov.bd/. The DGHS’s webpage has data 
on 424 Upazila (sub-districts) (out of a total of 476 Upazila).  
5.1.6 Online Survey 
For the last article, it was important to understand the preferences of mothers regarding modes 
of childbirth (normal versus cesarean delivery) and related issues such as cost, length of stay 
in the health facilities, complications, and so forth. A very small scale (n = 44) online survey 
was therefore conducted. The survey respondents were selected based on convenience and 
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snowball techniques. First, an online questionnaire was sent to mothers who were known to 
the researchers. The mothers were asked to forward the link of the survey to other mothers 
who were known to them. The gathered data is not representative of the country as a whole, as 
it mainly reflects the opinions of some middle-class educated women. 
5.2 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis for the first five studies is mainly individual. Each individual 
respondent’s ratings and responses on different performance and governance indicators along 
with his or her cultural orientation were used to explain the level of trust in different public 
institutions. In the last article on credence goods, the unit of analysis consists mainly of those 
organizations which are involved in childbirth in Bangladesh. This study tried to compare the 
nature of services among the different types of health service providers: the government 
hospitals, private clinics, and NGO health facilities.   
5.3 Reliability and Validity of the Studies 
Possible problems relating to the reliability of data from WVS 6 and EVS 4 may explain the 
inflated trust reported in the underperforming countries. However, amongst all the available 
data sources on institutional trust and the related issues, these data sources are considered 
quite comprehensive, reliable, authentic, and rigorous. Several scholarly articles have already 
been published based on these databases (e.g., Inglehart and Welzel, 2010; Delhey, et al., 
2011; Norris, 2013; Jung, 2017; Buzasi, 2015). Statistics from EVS show that up to 
November 2017, there are 1,643 publications based on EVS (EVS, 2017). In addition to this, 
other surveys such as Afro-barometer, Asia-barometer/Global-barometer, and the Governance 
and Trust survey 2 (GoT 2) also indicate a similar pattern of inflated institutional trust in 
certain countries with poor institutional performance and weak governance. The trend of 
relatively high trust despite poor institutional performance is therefore not an anomalous 
finding from a single survey.  
The studies of this dissertation mainly used the GoT 2 survey data to analyze the level of 
institutional trust in the sample countries. Most of this survey’s questions are similar to WVS 
6 questions. The GoT 2 survey questionnaire was prepared in English by two faculty members 
from the University of Bergen, Norway. After this, the partnering team from each of the three 
countries translated the questionnaire so that it could be easily understood by the local 
respondents. Three universities, one from each country, collaborated with the University of 
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Bergen.3 In each university, a research team worked under the leadership of an academic. For 
sampling, the respective country’s voter list was used to choose a sample from the population; 
around 50 respondents were randomly selected from each selected polling station (details on 
the total sample for each country, and other related information, can be found in Table 3 in the 
appendix). During this selection process, different demographic attributes were taken into 
consideration. It can therefore be said that the samples from these countries are random and 
more or less representative. Owing to all these procedures, it can also be said that the data 
from GoT 2 is relatively reliable. Sometimes, however, it was difficult to locate the selected 
respondents from the lower income group because of their ‘floating’ nature. There are thus 
some issues of representativeness within the lower income group.  
There can be yet another possible explanation for the higher level of institutional trust despite 
lower performance and poor governance: people may be afraid to provide ‘honest’ or ‘real’ 
responses. If this is the case, then people would be reticent to speak about corruption in public 
bodies and by public officials. Focusing on South Asia, Figures 6 and 7 indicate that most of 
the respondents (around 90 percent) from the GoT 2 survey expressed their opinions on 
corruption committed by political leaders and civil servants. 
  
Figure 6: People’s perceptions of politicians’ 
involvement with corruption (%) 
Figure 7: People’s perceptions of civil 
servants’ involvement with corruption (%) 
Source: GoT 2 Survey 
                                                          
3 The North South University in Bangladesh, Tribhuvan University in Nepal, and the University of Peradeniya in Sri Lanka. 
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If the fear factor truly applies, then respondents would have chosen a safe option such as 
‘don’t know’, or even refrained from answering the survey questions. Table 2 indicates that 
the percentage of ‘don’t know’, ‘not answered’, and ‘system missing’ in the GoT 2 survey is 
less than 10 percent. This means the majority of the people freely expressed their opinions on 
corruption, indicating that fear was not a decisive factor when they evaluated different public 
institutions.  
Table 2: People’s perceptions of corruption amongst politicians and civil servants (%) 
Country 
Involvement 
with 
corruption 
Everyone Quite many Some 
Just 
a 
few 
None Don’t know 
Not 
answered 
System 
missing Total 
Bangladesh 
Politicians 5.2 48.1 33.7 6.1 .8 6.0 - .2 100 
Civil servants 3.2 39.9 40.1 7.9 1.7 6.9 - .2 100 
Nepal 
Politicians 18.9 33.6 21.1 17.9 1.4 6.2 - .8 100 
Civil servants 10.2 25.6 27.0 25.0 3.3 8.0 - .9 100 
Sri Lanka 
Politicians 7.1 50.2 27 12.1 .4 2.9 .4 0 100 
Civil servants 2.4 30.5 38.3 23.3 1.4 3.7 .4 .1 100 
Note: The ‘Not answered’ option was only available for Sri Lanka, and the question asked was ‘Are 
the politicians/civil servants involved with corruption?’ 
Source: GoT 2 Survey 
The same is the case for the data from the Afro-barometer. Table 4 (in the appendix) indicates 
that most of the people expressed their opinions on the nature of corruption amongst their 
public authorities. Different studies (Shi, 2001; Wang, 2005) also show that while people are 
critical (they talk about corruption) of their authorities, they at the same time display 
relatively high institutional trust. In a study on China where there is also inflated institutional 
trust, Shi (2001) finds a very weak correlation (r = .04 to .14) between political fear and 
institutional trust. Similarly, in the NORHED survey and in Afro-barometer, people express 
their opinions on corruption amongst their authorities, but at the same time, express relatively 
high trust in their public institutions. So, the ‘fear factor’ may not be an important factor to 
influence the surveyed data. Due to all these factors, the data of GoT 2 and Afro-barometer 
may be reliable enough for conducting further analysis.  
The sixth article is based on registry data on the health system of Bangladesh. This data, 
which is from the Government of Bangladesh (2015), is quite comprehensive and the best 
available on this issue. Nevertheless, there can be problems with the data, since it may not 
have been acquired through rigorous data-collection procedures. Like other developing 
countries, Bangladesh may also have problems in data collection and data management. Since 
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this is the main government-generated data on such an issue on a country wide scale, it was 
deemed relevant to use.   
The research questions for the various studies of this dissertation are mainly formulated based 
on the inconsistencies between theoretical expectations and empirical findings (outlined 
above). The variables for the studies are mainly developed on the basis of the existing theories 
of institutional trust and the possible contextual factors (e.g., ACO). Thus, the elements of the 
different studies are constructed by following logical sequences. The Cronbach’s Alphas for 
the measurement of ACO are greater than the convention, that is, greater than 0.6, which 
indicates that the measurement is internally consistent and reliable (details are in article 3). 
The connections between independent and dependent variables are established using different 
techniques (mainly quantitative). Those analyses make it possible to see how the variable of 
interest – ACO – affects institutional trust.  
In order to extend the external validity of the findings on ACO beyond the three South Asian 
countries, another study was conducted based on 32 countries in Africa that were included in 
Afro-barometer 5. Afro-barometer 5, however, does not have the exact measure of ACO that 
is used in the articles on South Asia. This study used the concept ‘degree of assertiveness’, 
which is somewhat similar to the concept of ACO and indicates a situation of power distance. 
Both measurements (for ACO and the degree of assertiveness) are consistent with the findings 
of Inglehart (2006), who shows that both South Asia and Africa have lower self-expression 
values. Both higher authoritarian cultural orientation (used in the articles on South Asia) and 
lower assertiveness (used in the article on Africa) are indicative of lower self-expression 
values. A study by Paluck and Green (2009) also shows that authoritarian culture contributes 
to higher institutional trust in Africa.  
6. Summaries of the Findings 
6.1 Article I: Linking Performance, Quality of Governance and Trust in the Civil 
Service: Does Culture Intercede in the Perceived Relationship?  
This article highlights that it may not be sufficient to explain a higher level of trust in the civil 
service in non-OECD countries by performance and governance indicators alone. An 
additional variable based on cultural orientation is put forward. The argument is that the 
existence of ‘power distance’ or an ‘authoritarian cultural orientation’ (ACO) in many non-
OECD countries may contribute to a higher level of trust despite the lower socio-economic 
performance of public institutions as compared to similar institutions in OECD countries. 
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High ACO indicates unquestioning obedience, loyalty, and reliance on authorities such as the 
government, political leaders, teachers, elders or anyone with a higher social rank, status, and 
reputation than that of the individual concerned (Ma and Yang, 2014). Accordingly, people 
with high ACO accept a strong hierarchical social order, and this may contribute to creating 
blind trust in authorities. Conversely, people with low ACO may challenge authorities and 
question the appropriateness and effectiveness of various public institutions. Thus, people 
possessing either of these contrasting cultural values will assess the effectiveness of an 
institution differently, and this can contribute to differences in their level of institutional trust. 
The study finds support for this argument by analyzing the data from the three South Asian 
countries (Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka). The study also finds that various perceived 
performance indicators such as the reduction of poverty, the development of the health 
system, and the maintenance of law and order contribute to determining the degree of 
institutional trust in the sampled countries. The perceived quality of governance also appears 
to be an important factor in shaping the degree of trust in the civil service in the sampled 
countries. When civil servants are perceived to be corrupt, people have less trust in them. 
Alternatively, when people perceive that they are receiving equal or just treatment from civil 
servants, they tend to trust the civil service more than when they perceive themselves as 
receiving biased or discriminatory treatment.  
The effect of ACO on institutional trust can be considered a ‘pull factor’ and a reason why we 
observe inflated trust in the sampled underperforming countries. In contrast, post-materialistic 
culture and the rise of critical citizens (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Norris, 2011) work as a 
‘push factor’ and decrease the level of institutional trust as found in various developed 
countries. These pull and push factors may contribute to creating the gap in the level of 
institutional trust identified between the non-OECD and OECD countries. This may provide a 
possible explanation to the main research puzzle of the study, that is, why certain non-OECD 
countries have higher institutional trust than the OECD countries, despite the non-OECD 
countries’ lower performance and poor governance. 
6.2 Article II: Mismatch between Lower Performance and Higher Trust in Civil Service: 
Can Culture Provide an Explanation?  
Article 2 explores the links between institutional trust and processes of service delivery in 
combination with ACO in the sampled countries. Processes of service delivery depend on 
implementers’ dispositions, for instance their degree of promptness and effectiveness or their 
responsiveness to service recipients. These service delivery processes as well as the perceived 
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output are considered to be important factors which can affect the degree of institutional trust 
(Van Ryzin, 2011). The study examined the effect of different aspects of service delivery 
under two categories: service enabling processes (SEP) and service impeding processes (SIP). 
It shows that SEP elements – for instance the degree of promptness and effectiveness, 
responsiveness, equal treatment, and following rules – all have positive effects on trust in the 
civil service. Alternatively, SIP elements such as corruption and difficulties in gaining access 
to civil servants have negative effects. This study also finds that higher ACO contributes to a 
higher level of institutional trust. Most interestingly, the aspects of service delivery are also 
influenced by ACO. People with higher ACO usually assess civil servants positively; they 
have a comparatively strong belief that civil servants are prompt, efficient, and tend to treat 
people equally.  
6.3 Article III: How May Culture Nurture Institutional Trust? Some Empirical Insights 
from Two South Asian Countries 
In this article, the effect of ACO on the level of trust in public institutions is tested in 
Bangladesh and Nepal. The institutions included in the test are the civil service, the 
parliament, the police, the army, the judiciary, the anti-corruption commission, NGOs, and 
educational institutions. This article’s main contribution to research is that it finds empirical 
support for the claim that ACO affects the level of trust in public institutions other than the 
civil service. Another interesting finding is that people who have high ACO tend to trust the 
institutions that are more visible and closely located to them, for instance local government 
agencies, than they trust the central government. Similarly, the lower judiciary attracts more 
trust than does the higher judiciary, and the police force attracts more trust than does the army 
amongst the people who possess the same cultural orientation. This may be because of the 
‘proximity factor’, given that the police force has higher visibility amongst the citizenry than 
the army does. In this study, the ‘degree of power’ also appears as an important factor; 
institutions which have higher administrative power in society (e.g., the civil service as 
compared to educational institutions) attract more trust among the people who have higher 
ACO. 
This article also finds that ACO increases with the increase in respondents’ age. Such a 
finding may indicate that this orientation is gradually imbedded through a ‘social learning 
process’; young people may display relatively less obedience to authority, but as they grow 
older and their social learning leads to increased obedience, this may in turn lead them to 
develop increased institutional trust. Lastly, the study finds that higher education and a higher 
22 
 
income level also lead to a reduction of ACO. Higher education may equip people with 
increased cognitive ability and awareness, and they may possess information which prompts 
them to question authority. These may help reduce the degree of unquestioning obedience 
which is the measure of ACO. The effect of education is also visible in the level of trust in the 
sampled countries’ governments. In both countries, the increase in the level of education leads 
to a decrease in the respondents’ trust in government. However, the income variable does not 
show a statistically significant effect in the regression on institutional trust. This may be 
because the variable ‘income’ works through other channels, for instance education, since 
higher income makes higher education more easily affordable.  
6.4 Article IV: Linking Trust, Performance, and Governance Quality: What Can 
Explain the Incongruity?  
This article uses data from Afro-barometer to explore cultural orientation that is similar to 
ACO – the degree of assertiveness – and its effect on institutional trust. For this cultural 
orientation, the people who perceive their government as their ‘employee’ are considered as 
having higher assertiveness, while those who perceived their government as their ‘parents’ are 
considered as having lower assertiveness. Based on this distinction in the degree of 
assertiveness (low vs. high), the study explores the variation of institutional trust in 32 
African countries. It finds statistically significant differences in the level of trust in different 
institutions (e.g., trust in president/prime minister, parliament, and police).  
The study indicates that people with lower assertiveness tend to have higher institutional trust. 
Further mechanisms for such variations between highly assertive and less assertive people 
may be associated with differences in their perceived notion of the ‘quality of governance’ 
and the ‘performance of the government’. The study finds that people with lower 
assertiveness tend to believe that there are fewer governance-related problems (e.g., 
corruption) than do people with higher assertiveness. The difference in the degree of 
assertiveness also affects people’s evaluation of different aspects of government performance. 
People with lower assertiveness assess different types of government performance (e.g., 
management of the economy and combatting crime) more positively than do people with 
higher assertiveness. Given that most of Afro-barometer’s respondents have lower 
assertiveness, the effect of this attribute on institutional trust is very significant in the sample 
African countries. The study also finds that with the increase of education level, institutional 
trust level also declines.  
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6.5 Article V: Dynamics of Corruption and Citizens’ Trust in Anti-corruption Agencies 
in Three South Asian Countries 
Institutional trust levels can be affected by variations in perceived rather than actual 
performance. This article analyzes variations in trust levels in anti-corruption agencies in 
Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. The findings reveal that an ACA may attract higher trust 
despite being relatively ineffective in controlling corruption. The anti-corruption agency of 
Nepal has attracted higher trust due to its campaign against petty corruption amongst lower-
level public officials, particularly against the school teachers who have forged academic 
certificates. But this agency has failed to curb grand-scale corruption, which usually involves 
higher-level politicians and bureaucrats. Such selective campaigns against corruption fail to 
reduce the overall corruption level in Nepal. The Nepalese people nevertheless tend to have 
relatively high trust in their anti-corruption agency. This may be because the campaign 
against lower-level officials may have had some ‘demonstration effects’ due to the high 
visibility of the agency’s actions. In the case of Bangladesh, the anti-corruption agency targets 
people who are high up in the power structure as well as lower level functionaries, but it does 
so selectively. It goes after people who belong to the political party in opposition to the 
government. In Sri Lanka, the anti-corruption agency is a more or less a non-functional 
institution that has failed to take any effective action against corruption.  
6.6 Article VI: Institutional Design for Credence Goods: Can the Existence of Financial 
Incentives be Problematic? Evidence from the Childbirth System of Bangladesh 
One of the core elements of New Public Management is to introduce incentive-based systems 
to increase output and productivity. However, the introduction of an incentive system can be 
problematic for some services, particularly those that provide credence goods. Expert services 
such as medical treatments, legal advice and automobile repair are all examples of credence 
goods (McCluskey, 2000). Due to the unfamiliarity and the nature of the goods in question, a 
consumer may not be in a position to judge what he or she actually needs (Emons, 1997). 
Even after receiving a credence good or service, a consumer may not be able to judge whether 
a suggested quality was or was not actually provided (McCluskey, 2000; Dulleck and 
Kerschabamer, 2006). Due to the great cloud of unknowing about these kinds of services, a 
consumer must simply trust an expert. Credence goods can therefore create information 
asymmetry (when one person has more or better information than others) between a service 
provider and a recipient. In such a situation, having an incentive system for the service 
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providers, to enhance their work motivation, may be problematic, as it may lead them to 
behave opportunistically to achieve personal gain.   
This article finds support in favor of this argument from the childbirth system of Bangladesh. 
It indicates that physicians from the private clinics tend to go for overtreatment; they mostly 
choose cesarean delivery, and in most cases, it is not based on medical grounds but may be 
motivated by financial incentives. Huge differences in the volume of cesarean delivery (5-10 
times) between lower (government and NGOs health facilities) and higher (private clinics) 
incentive-based institutions may be indicative of this problem. The physicians working in 
government and NGO clinics have less incentive than the private clinics to choose 
overtreatment, since their earnings usually do not depend on the services they provide.   
7. Discussions: Overall Contributions and Synthesis with the Overarching Theoretical 
Framework 
The theoretical framework for this dissertation indicates that both the logic of consequences 
and the logic of appropriateness can contribute to determining the degree of institutional trust. 
If we use these forms of logic as lenses for analyzing the findings of the articles, we can 
observe the importance of both logics. The first three articles, which explain institutional trust 
in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, indicate that the authoritarian cultural orientation 
(ACO) has a statistically significant effect on institutional trust. People who have higher ACO 
tend to have higher institutional trust principally because they tend to defer to authority. Their 
cost-benefit logic (i.e., the logic of consequences) is affected by their obedience to authority. 
This obedience relates to the degree of appropriateness of certain behaviors that are connected 
with values and norms. We can therefore see the importance of the logic of appropriateness 
for determining the level of institutional trust. This can provide a possible explanation to why 
there is inflated trust in public institutions in the sampled countries.  
The fourth article, which concerns African countries, finds that people’s degree of 
assertiveness affects their institutional trust. People with lower assertiveness tend to have 
higher trust in government than do people with higher assertiveness. This may be because 
people with higher assertiveness are more conscious of their rights, and, accordingly, are 
more demanding and calculative of these demands. The concept ‘lower assertiveness’ 
identified in this article is connected with the concept ‘authoritarian cultural orientation’ 
identified in the articles on South Asia, as people with higher ACO also have lower 
assertiveness due to their obedience to authority. On the other hand, people with higher 
assertiveness may be more critical of authorities and their roles, and may therefore have lower 
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ACO. The previous three articles’ claim of the possible effect of the logic of appropriateness 
in explaining institutional trust becomes stronger due to the findings of fourth article, as it is 
based on the additional 32 African countries.  
The articles in this dissertation also confirm that the logic of consequences affects people’s 
institutional trust, since the perceived degree of quality of governance and the level of 
institutional performance are shown to have a statistically significant relationship. For 
example, when respondents feel that there is higher corruption, their trust declines, and when 
they assess economic performance positively, their institutional trust increases. Nevertheless, 
the background for the studies in the dissertation was that the objective measure of 
performance was inconsistent with institutional trust in the sample countries – it appears that 
some of the perception-based data on performance has a statistically significant effect on 
institutional trust. This may be due to variation in respondents’ expectations about the 
performance of public institutions, since political trust is “the ratio of people’s evaluation of 
government performance relative to their normative expectations of how government ought to 
perform” (Hetherington and Husser, 2012: 313). From this definition, it appears that the frame 
of reference is very important for perceived performance and for institutional trust (Röder and 
Mühlau, 2012). If a person has relatively low expectations, then he or she may be happy with 
an institution’s lower performance and, accordingly, can have relatively high trust in that 
institution.   
The studies show that the evaluation of the indicators of the logic of consequences can also be 
affected by the logic of appropriateness because the indicators of logic of consequences show 
a statistically significant relationship with ACO. For example, people with higher ACO are 
more likely to perceive civil servants as prompt and efficient and to tend to treat everyone 
equally. It therefore becomes difficult to disentangle the effect of consequential factors 
(performance and governance quality) from the effect of ACO on institutional trust. Similarly, 
in the fourth article, it appears that people with lower assertiveness think that their society 
suffers from less corruption or unequal treatment than do the people with higher assertiveness. 
Due to variations in the degree of assertiveness, people have different standards for evaluating 
institutional performance and governance quality; these differences ultimately lead to the 
variations in institutional trust in the sample countries. These findings, which are revealed in 
the articles, indicate that certain values which an individual possess can shape his or her 
worldview and can lead to higher institutional trust despite lower performance and poor 
governance. Thus, the logic of appropriateness (here ACO) can shape the application of the 
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logic of consequences. The endogenous effects of these factors (performance/governance and 
cultural orientation) on institutional trust are also indicated by Ruscio (1996), who confirms 
that norms and values influence behavior in combination with self-interest. Ruscio claims that 
people’s different social obligations cause them to calculate differently. Thus, people with 
relatively high ACO also have a relatively high level of institutional trust. This can explain 
the existence of inflated trust in the sampled countries despite their under-performance in 
most indicators of governance. According to Sztompka (1999), this kind of inflated trust can 
be regarded as blind or naive, because these trusting people discount negative evidence and 
take a ‘pure leap of faith’. The findings of the studies in this dissertation are consistent with 
the observations of Van Ryzin (2007) and Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2007 and 2003); Van 
Ryzin (2007) warns that it is too simplistic to assume that citizens directly respond to 
government outcomes. Rather, their trust in government reflects the way they interpret their 
government’s performance.   
The third article indicates that age is positively correlated with ACO, meaning older people 
tend to have higher ACO. This may indicate that ACO develops with age, as part of the social 
learning process. Young people tend to be relatively more assertive, but as they grow older, 
they develop ACO. This claim about the effect of age has one limitation: it is not measured 
within the same person. If such a measurement were possible, it could strengthen the claim. 
This article also finds that higher education leads to a reduction in ACO. This could be 
because higher education can create a higher cognitive ability, which can cause a person to 
become more assertive, to question authorities and their actions, and to help reduce the 
person’s degree of obedience to authority. Education may thus contribute to rationalizing the 
‘logic of appropriateness’ and help increase the dominance of the application of the ‘logic of 
consequences’. Nevertheless, in the regression analysis, the negative effect of education on 
institutional trust is only visible for trust in government in the sample three South Asian 
countries; it is not visible for trust in the civil service of those countries. This may be because 
educated people are more critical of government than they are of civil service. 
The fourth article also indicates that higher education can lead to reducing trust in 
government. The negative affect of education on institutional trust is supported by a study by 
Wang and You (2016), who show that trust in political institutions is declining in China – an 
Asian country with a strong hierarchical culture. This decline is happening in the face of rapid 
economic growth, yet at a rather slow pace. The two scholars argue that due to socio-
economic modernization, the Chinese people are acquiring stronger liberal democratic values; 
27 
 
their freedom is expanding and they are being empowered as citizens. In this modernization 
process, education is playing an important role. Meanwhile, Christensen and Lægreid (2005) 
argue that higher education can also create a higher probability to trust in government. But 
there are other scholars, for instance Kim (2010), who claim that higher education can 
contribute to reducing a person’s trust in government, given that knowledge can result in an 
increase in critical attitudes. The findings of this dissertation on trust in government mainly 
support the latter claim. Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012) identify two mechanisms related to 
education which can affect institutional trust: the norm-inducing function and the accuracy-
inducing function. Due to the norm-inducing function, people with higher education are more 
likely than less educated people to be morally troubled by a lack of institutional quality; due 
to the accuracy-inducing function, more highly educated people have better and more 
sophisticated skills for judging institutional performance and processes.  
Christensen and Lægreid’s (2005) findings on education are based on studies of Norwegian 
citizens who already have a liberal political culture and a strong welfare state. In such a 
context, education may help people understand the importance of the socio-political goods 
they enjoy, and consequently, their institutional trust grows. However, many other countries 
lack such goods, and this is why the high levels of trust found there are considered blind, 
naive, or inflated. In such situations, education can make citizens critical of public institutions 
and help to reduce the blind trust that arises through unquestioning obedience to authorities 
(the measure of ACO). The reduction of trust may reflect their aspiration for a better system 
of governance, and this, in turn, can be understood as part of an evolutionary process of 
human empowerment. The empowerment process indicates the effects of having developed an 
independent personality. In recognizing this personality change, Ma and Yang (2014: 327) 
say that “the hierarchical, obedient, and dependent personality attributes found in 
authoritarian orientations conflict with modern culture, which advocates equal and 
independent interpersonal relationships between people.” They also say that the speed and the 
extent of changes are dependent on cultural inertia and elements of the given social 
environment, for instance changes in the social structure and political system. The nature of 
the effects of education on institutional trust is explained further in an empirical study by 
Güemes and Herreros (2018). These scholars show that the effect of education is dependent 
on state efficacy; in a weak state, educated people are less trusting, and alternatively, in those 
countries where state efficacy is higher, educated people tend to have more trust.   
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The article on trust in anti-corruption agencies also indicates that the application of the logic 
of consequence is not universal but affected by local contexts. The Nepalese anti-corruption 
agency does not play a significant role in reducing the overall corruption in Nepal because it 
takes no action against higher-level officials and politicians. It nevertheless enjoys higher trust 
due to its relatively strong actions against lower-level officials, particularly against school 
teachers with fake educational certificates. These actions raise the agency’s visibility in the 
public sphere and may contribute to the higher institutional trust it receives. Considering all 
the dynamics of the anti-corruption drive of the Nepalese agency, one Nepalese respondent 
opined: 
This is like killing mosquitoes instead of stopping the source of mosquitoes. Top level officials 
are the source of mosquitoes, while school teachers and lower level officials are like 
mosquitoes. 
The article on the childbirth system in Bangladesh indicates that due to information 
asymmetry, it is difficult to judge the ‘logic of consequence’ for credence goods. Because of 
the nature and complexities of the services, consumers cannot assess their actual needs, and 
even after consumption, are uncertain of whether proper and adequate services were provided. 
The consumers must simply trust the service providers. Thomas (1998) defines this kind of 
trust as ‘fiduciary trust’, illustrating it through principal-agent relationships, where principals 
are unable to monitor the performance of the agents. This is why principals are vulnerable to 
both malfeasance and misfeasance. Given that the private clinics’ operating costs are mainly 
covered by earnings from the services they provide, there is an incentive for the service 
providers to take advantage of this information asymmetry and opt for overtreatment.  
8. Implications of the Identified Cultural Attribute 
One of the main contributions of the studies of this dissertation is to find the effect of ACO on 
institutional trust. Nevertheless, these studies do not explore the possible effects of this 
cultural orientation on other aspects such as governance and management style. Other related 
studies, however, may give us some indications of the possible implications of ACO on such 
aspects. In this connection, it may be useful to state that the definition used to describe ACO 
in this dissertation is close to what Schwartz (1999) calls ‘hierarchical cultural value’ and 
what Hosfstede et al. (2010) call ‘power distance’. Schwartz (1999: 27) defines hierarchy as 
“a cultural emphasis on the legitimacy of an unequal distribution of power, roles and 
resources (social power, authority, humility, wealth).” Societies that have this value comply 
with the obligations and the rules attached to hierarchal roles and show deference to superiors. 
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Hofstede et al. (2010: 61) indicate a similar dimension with the concept of ‘power distance’, 
which they define as the “extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and 
organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.” The 
articles in this dissertation use ACO to describe similar asymmetrical power relations in a 
society.  
At the state level, ACO can be beneficial because there is less resistance to governance due to 
the loyalty of the people. Countries with proper leadership may prosper, as top-down 
decisions are easier to implement. East Asian countries such as Singapore and South Korea 
probably benefit from this kind of culture. Cheng et al. (2014) describe the leadership style of 
these Asian countries as ‘paternalistic’, for leaders have authority and control over 
subordinates, and rewards are granted to subordinates in exchange for their acquiescence. But 
this leadership style can be problematic if authorities are corrupt. In an obedience-based 
culture, it is difficult to make authorities accountable; rather, such a culture can facilitate the 
misuse of power and repressive governance (Bouckaert and Van de Walle, 2003). Welzel and 
Dalton (2017) show that an allegiant culture is beneficial for effective governance while an 
assertive culture can ensure accountable governance. Similarly, Jain and Jain (2018) show 
that in high power-distance situations, the demand for transparency decreases. This is why 
lower trust is considered a healthy democratic attitude (Bouckaert and Van de Walle, 2003). 
Dalton and Ong (2005) claim that Western societies are rights-based and individualistic, and 
that these qualities are consistent with the competitive elements of democracy. Here, people 
have the freedom to disagree with leaders and to demand for more consultative leadership. 
East Asian societies, by contrast, are paternalistic and have allegiance to authority. These 
qualities are inconsistent with democracy. This is why, while discussing Asian culture, 
Fukuyama (1998: 1) states that “…people are born not with rights but with duties to a series 
of hierarchically-arranged authorities, beginning with the family and extending all the way up 
to the state” (cited in Chang and Chu, 2006). 
Khatri (2009) has identified a number of organizational-level effects of this cultural attribute. 
In a high power-distance context, decision making and the implementation of the decisions in 
an organization can be speedier, but the quality of decisions may be poorer because there may 
be a lack of input from lower-level employees. In such an organization, jobs are narrowly and 
tightly specified and top-level managers are occupied with making routine and minor 
decisions. They may need to get involved in micromanagement. Communication usually takes 
place vertically, and lower-level employees are unwilling to participate in decision making. 
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Older and senior employees receive respect due to their longer tenure in the organization. An 
organization with high power distance is prone to unethical behavior since the top-level 
officials do not need to justify their decisions. Another study by Lian and Ferris (2012) finds 
that subordinates with a high power-distance orientation are more tolerant of supervisory 
mistreatment than are subordinates with a low power-distance orientation.  
There is one study which can be indicative of the group level effect of this cultural 
orientation. Anicich et al. (2014), who have done research on Himalayan mountain climbers 
(total 30,625 climbers from 56 countries), show that more climbers from countries with a 
hierarchic culture reach the summit of a given peak than do climbers from other cultures, but 
at the same time, there is a larger percentage of climbers from the hierarchical culture who die 
along the way. This study reveals both functional and dysfunctional aspects of hierarchal 
culture. One functional aspect is to have success in reaching the summit due to increased 
coordination; a dysfunctional aspect is that performance is impaired because the concerns and 
voices of lower-ranking climbers are blocked. The second article in this dissertation indicates 
one possible individual level effect of ACO. This article indicates that people with higher 
ACO tend to have higher satisfaction in life. This may be because they do not think or bother 
too much about different issues. On the other hand, people with lower ACO tend to 
experience higher stress, perhaps because of their assertiveness and consciousness. Being 
assertive and conscious of rights may lead them to do more intense and sophisticated 
evaluation and calculation of different events and actions.  
9. Limitations of the Studies and Scope for Future Research on Institutional Trust 
The articles in this dissertation can have several limitations which should be kept in mind. 
Future research on institutional trust is needed to address these potential limitations. First, 
there can be a problem in the conceptualization of the main dependent variable ‘institutional 
trust’ and in its measurement. The studies of this dissertation consider trust and confidence as 
similar constructs. This is because terms such as trust, confidence, perception, and image of 
government are often used interchangeably as ‘catch all’ terms (Van de Walle and Bouckaert, 
2003). Different surveys also measure trust through confidence. Luhmann (1988 cited in Joon, 
2004), however, makes a distinction between confidence and trust. Confidence, he argues, is 
associated with asymmetrical relationships and is related to real danger and contingency. 
Alternatively, the concept of trust is associated with modern society, where danger is replaced 
with risk and is dependent on a calculation of risk. Thus, according to Luhmann’s thinking, 
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there are differences between confidence and trust. If a person does not have any alternative 
solutions to a given problem, then he or she is in a situation of confidence. 
The survey component which is used to measure institutional trust in the articles is “I am 
going to name a number of organizations and institutions. For each one, could you tell me 
how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of 
confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” It is possible that this measure of 
institutional trust may reflect different things in different societies. In some countries it may 
reflect Luhmann’s (1988) concept of confidence, as there is higher power distance between an 
ordinary person and an authority figure. People in such society would rely on the authority to 
solve their problems, but such problem-solving mechanisms are not automatic or matters of 
course. In many cases the people will be dependent on the whim of the authority and will 
have very limited alternatives for dealing with such unpredictable behavior. They will be 
helpless because of limited opportunities to bargain or negotiate with the authority. Simply 
raising their voice can bring further troubles. In a high power-distance culture, demonstrations 
of obedience and loyalty may often help people gain favor from the authority. In such 
situations the power is asymmetrical, and if an authority does not intend to provide services, 
or if that authority treats people unfairly, then in most cases, people will have very little say in 
the matter. In contrast, in modern societies that have more freedom and formal space to 
negotiate with authorities and to create pressure on them if they act unjustly, trust is related to 
the calculation of risk. It therefore appears that the current measure of institutional trust may 
have different meanings in different countries. The higher trust in under-performing countries 
can be analogous to confidence in God: for any personal misfortune or disaster, confidence in 
God may not decline; rather, it will incite the believer to pray even more, and to show 
confidence in God precisely in order to gain God’s favor. 
There may also be a limitation on the measurement of the main independent variable ‘ACO’. 
The respondents who scored high in the measure of ACO may have done so because they 
benefit from this kind of obedience-based system, but in practice, they may not actually be all 
that obedient to their authority. For instance, those who supported the statement: “it is natural 
that those with power, money and belonging to a high-status family background should be 
respected and obeyed”, may have done so because they are the beneficiaries of this 
hierarchical system, but in reality, they may not be all that obedient towards their authority. 
The current studies tried to minimize the effect of this problem by controlling for the income 
level of the respondents. The articles do not discuss the formation of ACO or the mechanisms 
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through which it develops in a person or in a society. Only the relationship between ACO and 
institutional trust is explored. The current studies do not explore the dynamics between 
specific and diffuse trust as indicated by Easton (1975). The unit of analysis for the studies on 
institutional trust is mainly individual, but country-level analysis could have made the studies’ 
claims (such as the effect of ACO) more convincing and comprehensive.  
Next, there can be a problem in the measurement of independent variables. The articles in this 
dissertation used perceived performance to understand institutional trust, since institutional 
trust is supposed to be formed on the basis of people’s perceived understanding of 
performance. Although such perceptions cannot be created without objective evidence, Yang 
and Holzer (2006) have identified three factors which can moderate or mediate performance-
trust relationships: a) grievance asymmetry – good performances can go unnoticed while bad 
performances and their related grievances can affect trust; b) summation – there are different 
agencies in civil service and government, and some of them may feature more strongly in 
citizens’ mind than others; c) expectations – citizens may differ in their expectations, and this 
is why their reactions to the same level of performance can vary. The perception-based data 
for the studies of this dissertation can be affected by these factors, but the studies do not 
develop further techniques to address the issues.  
There is another limitation to the measurement of performance related indicators: the studies 
of the dissertation do not distinguish between the performance of civil service and that of 
government. Performance indicators such as the ‘reduction of poverty’ or ‘management of the 
economy’ can be the performance of both civil service and government, but the contributions 
of these may differ. In the first article, these indicators point to the performance of civil 
service, whereas in the fourth article, similar indicators are used to point to the performance of 
government. These studies do not distinguish the performance of civil service from that of 
government, and this is precisely because of their connected and complex nature. Van de 
Walle et al. (2008) also points this out and mentions that it is difficult to measure the 
performance of the public sector as a whole. 
The current studies do not explore the role of political scandal, which can cause institutional 
trust to fluctuate quickly (Bowler and Karp, 2004). And then there is the ‘perceptual bias’ of 
survey responses, which can cause considerable variation in perception-based data 
(Erlingsson and Kristinsson, 2016). For example, people usually overestimate the threat of 
crime and corruption. According to Anderson and Singer (2008), people’s ideological 
predisposition can affect their evaluation of performance, and accordingly, their institutional 
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trust level. People who identify themselves as politically right wing are less likely to view 
inequality negatively than do others (Anderson and Singer, 2008). The findings of this 
dissertation may be affected by these factors, but since there are clear statistically significant 
trends in the studies, the findings can be important to contemplate further.  
Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2003) list different performance indicators and identity-related 
indicators to explain institutional trust, but a number of these identity-related indicators are 
not included in the analyses of the studies of this dissertation. For example, party loyalty as an 
explanatory variable for institutional trust is not included, even though it is a very important 
variable for defining trust in different countries (Christensen and Lægreid, 2005; Anderson 
and LoTempio, 2002). The article on Africa does not include ethnic divisions as an 
explanatory variable in the regression models, even though ethnicity can be an important 
explanatory variable in the African context (Franck and Rainer, 2012; Zerfu, Zikhali, and 
Kabenga, 2008). From the data on African countries, Chang and Kerr (2017) show that 
individuals who have partisan or ethnic relationships with rulers are less likely to consider 
corruption as widespread. Due to the large variation of ethnic groups across 32 countries, the 
study did not include this variable in the regression models. The articles discussing the South 
Asian countries also do not include some context-specific identity variables. For example, in 
Sri Lanka, the ethnic division between Sinhalese and Tamil respondents may affect 
respondents’ level of institutional trust. Similarly, in Nepal, ethnicity and caste may have 
affected respondents’ institutional trust. A study by Askvik et al. (2011), however, shows that 
different identity variables have little significance in explaining the degree of institutional 
trust in Nepal. 
Methodologically, most of the articles in this dissertation can have ‘common method bias’, 
which is a systematic variance among the variables that is due to the measurement method 
itself, rather than to the theoretical constructs the measurements represent (MacKenzie and 
Podsakoff. 2012, cited in Jakobsen and Jensen, 2015). The explanation sections in the first 
five articles are mainly based on the same survey responses, from either the GoT 2 survey or 
Afro-barometer 5. This is why the findings of these articles can be affected by common 
method bias.   
The regression models in the analysis sections of the articles on institutional trust may also 
have limitations. The institutional trust variable is measured by a 4-point Likert scale that 
does not reflect an ideal continuous variable. Using linear regression to analyze these 
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dependent variables may therefore have limitations. However, there is literature (such as 
Pasta, 2009) which lends support to the use of ordinal variables for linear regression.  
The studies do not find any effect of generalized trust on institutional trust in the sampled 
countries. One possible explanation for this relates to the existence of a lower level of 
generalized trust in the sampled countries. However, there may be another explanation based 
on the problem of measuring this variable. Although these studies use the standard measure of 
generalized trust that is used in established surveys such as WVS, there are studies which 
show that the results from WVS do not correlate with the findings of experimental studies 
(senders’ behavior in the ‘trust game’) (Sapinza et al., 2013). 
In the article on anti-corruption agencies, the data from Transparency International is used to 
understand the magnitude of corruption in the sample countries. This data, however, is not 
based on an objective measurement of corruption, but on expert opinions. It may therefore 
have the same type of problems which are found in perception-based data (over-estimation or 
under-estimation due to different limitations and biases). This article does not inquire into the 
effect of ACO. This is because the study was conducted before the idea of the possible effect 
of ACO was conceived. Notwithstanding, the other articles in this dissertation on South Asia 
do indicate that ACO can affect the level of trust in the anti-corruption agencies of the sample 
three countries.  
The last article, which tries to show the problem of overtreatment during childbirth in the 
private clinics of Bangladesh, is different than the other articles and does not fit properly with 
the main theoretical framework. One of its weaknesses is its inability to identify the exact 
number of cesarean deliveries based on each of the possible reasons (e.g., medical necessity, a 
mother’s own preference, and opportunistic behavior of the service providers). The 
comparative analysis of the volume of cesarean delivery at the private clinics with the volume 
at the government hospitals and NGO health facilities may be indicative of the problem of 
overtreatment, but this indication is inconclusive. Nevertheless, a report from the World 
Health Organization (2015) indicates that the ideal rate for caesarean sections is between 10-
15 percent, and that there is no justification for any hospital to have a higher rate than this. 
Having around 65 percent cesarean delivery in the private clinics is therefore certainly an 
indication of the overtreatment problem. On top of this limitation, the database used for this 
study is confined to the sub-districts – there is no data from major cities such as the capital 
Dhaka. As most of the private clinics are located in major cities, it is highly likely that the 
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overtreatment problem of cesarean delivery is more acute in the large cities, but the study 
could not include them due to the non-availability of data.  
The articles in this dissertation do not explore the mechanisms for restoring or building trust, 
which is the main focus of many institutional trust-related studies in Western countries. Based 
on the studies in this dissertation, it appears that many developing countries have higher 
institutional trust when they should actually have lower trust due to lower performance and 
poor governance. Because of this mismatch, the institutional trust in these countries can be 
considered inflated or blind. Such unwarranted trust may be a problem for these countries as 
indicated by political science literature (Van de Walle and Six, 2014). For example, according 
to the classical liberal theory, distrust is rational and trust is naive (Hardin, 2002), for with a 
high level of trust, there is a risk that checks and balances will be hollowed out (Van de Walle 
and Six, 2014). As such, the decline of inflated trust may not be a problem. Instead, it may 
indicate that people are becoming increasingly sophisticated about the conditions of trust 
(Warren, 1999). This means their blind trust is reduced and they become more objective in 
analyzing the performance of public institutions. This may help create pressure on authorities 
and to induce them to improve their performance. The studies of this dissertation do not 
develop mechanisms to differentiate between which types of trust increase efficiency and 
which types are so naive as to create governance-related problems. In liberal Western 
societies, having higher trust can probably increase efficiency, but in the non-liberal societies, 
having higher trust can create governance related problems, such as the failure to ensure 
accountable and responsive governance. In these latter societies, less blind or naive trust can 
help to improve governance quality.  
The limitations identified in this section may provide ‘food for thought’ for future studies on 
institutional trust. Having the same measurement for ACO across all the countries may lead to 
more rigorous analysis and help in measuring the power of this variable in explaining 
institutional trust within and across societies. If, by adopting an experimental research design, 
we can change the extent of different cultural orientations (e.g., ACO and post-materialism) 
and can find the effect of such changes on institutional trust, then we might possibly gain 
robust support for the effects of these cultural attributes on institutional trust.  
10. Conclusion 
The findings outlined in this dissertation do not negate rational choice theory but add an 
additional layer of insight that helps us to capture a more complex reality. This layer is based 
on the logic of appropriateness (here ACO), which is derived from contextual factors. It helps 
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us to understand the complexities associated with institutional trust in the sampled countries 
and consequently also to overcome a simplistic understanding of the logic of consequence and 
rational choice theory and how they relate to institutional trust. Due to these complexities, 
researchers need to be cautious when comparing institutional trust across different countries: 
institutional trust may not reflect similar things in all countries and societies. We can be led 
astray if we take for granted that the measured trust levels are only reflections of people’s 
objective assessments of institutional performance and governance quality. For this reason, it 
may not be appropriate to consider institutional trust as the proxy to measure institutional 
performance and governance quality. This is also echoed by Bouckaert and Van de Walle 
(2003), as they claim that current attempts to measure trust and satisfaction in government can 
be misleading if they are assumed to measure good governance. In different countries, 
institutional trust may stem from different roots. While a post-materialistic and assertive 
culture may lead to lower institutional trust (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Norris, 2011) even 
when institutions have higher performance (a fact in many Western countries), an 
authoritarian cultural orientation may generate higher trust in public institutions despite the 
poor performance of institutions. Therefore, in any initiative to assess citizens’ perceptions of 
public services and institutional trust, cultural orientations and contextual factors must be 
taken into account, as these are found to be relevant and useful in this dissertation. 
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Appendix 
Table 3: Quick overview of the Governance and Trust Survey 2 
Country Nepal Bangladesh Sri Lanka 
Year of 
survey 
2014 2014-15 2014-15 
Sample size 
2nd Wave 
2404 2748 
 
1648 
 
Selection of 
sample 
2nd Wave  
 
Used voter list; (20% of 
constituencies, i.e. 48 
constituencies were 
selected to conduct survey 
on the respondents; one 
polling booth was 
randomly selected and 
from there, 50 voters were 
selected from each polling 
booth) 
Used voter list; (20% of 
constituencies, i.e. 60 
constituencies were selected 
to conduct survey on the 
respondents; one polling 
booth was randomly 
selected and from there, 50 
voters were selected from 
each polling booth) 
Used voter list; (among 25 district 
12 were selected; within each 
selected district, GNDs (Grama 
Niladhari divisions) were chosen 
based on ethnic composition, and 
geographical location. Every 5th 
odd number in the electoral 
registry household was selected; 
first sample unit (household 
/respondent) had been randomly 
selected and remaining units were 
selected at fixed equal intervals 
from one another. In this way, 20-
25 households were interviewed) 
Source: NORHED Survey Documents (unpublished)  
 
Table 4: Citizens’ perception on the involvement with corruption of the office of their 
President/ Prime Minister 
Countries Involvement with Corruption of the Office of President/Prime Minister (%) 
Total 
Respondents 
Nigeria 97.55 2367 
Cameroon 94.74 950 
Uganda 94.04 2232 
Kenya 91.93 2155 
Ghana 91.55 2307 
South Africa 91.16 2273 
Togo 90.13 932 
Sierra Leone 89.29 1158 
Mali 88.96 1105 
Swaziland 88.43 968 
Benin 87.55 1092 
Liberia 87.24 1089 
Zimbabwe 85.47 2188 
Egypt 85.41 1001 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 81.87 1026 
Zambia 81.18 1116 
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Countries Involvement with Corruption of the Office of President/Prime Minister (%) 
Total 
Respondents 
Niger 79.53 987 
Tanzania 76.12 2253 
Senegal 75.08 983 
Botswana 74.29 984 
Sudan 72.27 887 
Madagascar 72.03 690 
Mauritius 71.25 1026 
Burkina 
Faso 71.08 930 
Guinea 69.32 1066 
Lesotho 68.81 747 
Cape Verde 66.15 777 
Mozambique 65.88 1867 
Namibia 61.39 1080 
Burundi 60.75 981 
Malawi 60.24 1401 
Tunisia 58.44 770 
Algeria 45.22 962 
Total 80.39 42350 
Source: Afro-barometer, 2015 
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